
Unusual Markets: the Case of Kidney Exchange
Alvin Roth, Stanford University
I’ll point out that there are a wide variety of markets, including many in which prices don’t do all the work of deciding who gets what. Then I’ll focus on one of the most unusual markets I’ve helped design, the market for kidney exchanges, which have become a standard form of transplant in the U.S., and which help increase the number of living-donor transplants.
About Alvin Roth

Al Roth is the Craig and Susan McCaw Professor of Economics at Stanford University and the George Gund Professor Emeritus of Economics and Business Administration at Harvard. Al shared the 2012 Nobel memorial prize in Economics, ‘for the theory of stable allocations and the practice of market design.’ His work is in game theory, experimental economics, and market design.
He directed the redesign of the National Resident Matching Program, through which most American doctors find their first employment as residents at American hospitals. He has also helped in the reorganisation of the market for more senior physicians, as they pursue sub-specialty training and in other labour markets.
Al helped design the high school matching systems used in New York City, and the school choice systems for public and charter schools in other large American cities. He has helped in the design and implementation of kidney exchange, which allows incompatible patient-donor pairs to find compatible kidneys for transplantation.
Audience: Public